Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh & Ors., (2025) SC
Param Vijay Singh
10/27/20257 min read
Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh & Ors., (2025) SC
Civil Appeal Nos. 12703–12704 of 2025, decided on 15 October 2025
Coram: J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh (2025) marks another significant reaffirmation of the limited scope of judicial interference under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The ruling clarifies that the power to reject a plaint at the threshold can be exercised only on the basis of averments in the plaint and not on the basis of the defence raised by the opposite party.
Furthermore, the Court restated the settled principle that a suit for possession based on ownership or title cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation unless adverse possession by the defendant has been duly proved — a matter necessarily requiring evidence. In doing so, the judgment harmonizes the principles governing rejection of plaints, limitation for declaratory and possessory suits, and the distinction between questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law.
2. Facts of the Case
The litigation revolved around agricultural land originally owned by Ronak Singh alias Ronaki, who died intestate in 1924, leaving behind his widow Kartar Kaur. Upon his death, a dispute arose between Kartar Kaur and Ronak Singh’s sisters, Chinki and Nikki, who were the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs (Karam Singh and Dilbag Singh).
Kartar Kaur, having only a limited widow’s estate under pre-Hindu Succession Act law, executed a gift in favour of Harchand, which was declared invalid in 1935 on the ground that she possessed no alienable ownership right. Subsequent decrees (including one in 1975) affirmed Kartar Kaur’s limited ownership and possession. Mutation of the property was entered in her name in 1976.
After Kartar Kaur’s death in 1983, the defendants claimed ownership on the basis of a will dated 15 December 1976, allegedly executed by Kartar Kaur in their favour. Mutation was sanctioned in their names, but this was challenged by the plaintiffs’ predecessors. The dispute over the mutation travelled through multiple appellate forums and ultimately concluded against the plaintiffs only on 20 July 2017.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 424 of 2019 seeking:
A declaration that they were owners to the extent of their share;
A declaration that the alleged will and the corresponding mutation were null and void;
Possession of the suit land;
Mesne profits/damages; and
A permanent injunction.
3. Procedural History
The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, contending that the suit was barred by limitation and by Order II Rule 2 CPC, given an earlier suit filed by the plaintiffs’ father in 2012 had been dismissed.
The Trial Court dismissed the application (07.01.2020), holding that:
The question of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact, and
The bar under Order II Rule 2 could be considered as a separate issue at trial.
However, on revision, the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the defendants’ plea (27.01.2022), holding that the suit, instituted 36 years after Kartar Kaur’s death and execution of the will, was hopelessly time-barred. A subsequent application for recall was also rejected (04.07.2022).
Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
4. Issues Before the Supreme Court
Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation.
Whether the plaintiffs’ suit, seeking possession based on title, could be said to be barred by limitation on the face of the plaint.
Whether the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC, given the earlier dismissal of the 2012 suit.
What is the correct approach for determining whether a plaint is “barred by law” under Order VII Rule 11(d)?
5. Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff)
The suit was filed within three years of the conclusion of mutation proceedings (2017) and thus within limitation.
The main relief was possession based on ownership/title, for which the limitation period is 12 years under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, beginning when possession becomes adverse.
The High Court erred in treating the cause of action as arising in 1983 (death of Kartar Kaur) rather than 2017 (final mutation).
The High Court order was ex parte, as notice of revision was not served.
The earlier suit (2012) was not tried on merits but rejected under Order VII Rule 11; therefore, Order II Rule 2 did not apply.
Respondents (Defendants)
The plaintiffs were aware of the will since 1983; thus, a suit challenging it in 2019 was hopelessly time-barred.
The present suit was an abuse of process, being based on the same cause of action as the 2012 suit.
Cited precedents:
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467
Rajendra Bajoria v. Hemant Kumar Jalan, (2022) 12 SCC 641
Ramisetty Venkatanna v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 521
6. Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
Justice Manoj Misra, delivering the judgment, began by restating the settled position of law under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC:
“While considering rejection of the plaint under clause (d), only the averments made in the plaint and nothing else is to be considered to find out whether the suit is barred by law. At this stage, the defence is not to be considered.”
(a) Nature of the Plaint and Cause of Action
The Court observed that the plaintiffs claimed title by natural succession to Kartar Kaur, whereas the defendants relied upon an unprobated will. The plaint indicated that the plaintiffs had been contesting the will’s validity throughout mutation proceedings until 2017, and the suit was filed within three years thereafter. Therefore, it could not be said to be ex facie barred.
(b) Effect of Mutation Entries
Mutation entries, the Court reiterated, do not confer or extinguish title but serve merely fiscal purposes. Reliance was placed on:
Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (1997) 7 SCC 137
Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner (2007) 6 SCC 186
Consequently, the culmination of mutation proceedings did not determine ownership conclusively; a regular civil suit was maintainable.
(c) Suit for Possession Based on Title
The Court emphasized that for a suit based on ownership or title, Article 65 of the Limitation Act applies — providing 12 years from the date when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse. Until the defendant proves adverse possession, the plaintiff cannot be nonsuited. Citing Indira v. Arumugam (1998) 1 SCC 614, the Court held that the burden to establish adverse possession lies on the defendant, not the plaintiff.
(d) Multiplicity of Reliefs
Where a plaint seeks multiple reliefs, and at least one is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected in entirety under Order VII Rule 11(d). The Court cited Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208.
(e) Declaration with Further Relief
Relying on N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi & Village Industries Board, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037, and C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808, the Court reiterated that when a suit seeks declaration along with further relief such as possession, limitation is governed by the period prescribed for that further relief.
(f) Order II Rule 2 CPC
The earlier suit (2012) was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 and not tried on merits; thus, Order II Rule 2 did not apply. A subsequent suit with properly framed reliefs could not be deemed barred.
(g) Error of the High Court
The High Court, in treating the will as 36 years old and holding the suit time-barred, had overlooked the continuing contest over the will and the finalization of mutation proceedings only in 2017. Whether adverse possession had been perfected was a mixed question of law and fact, to be determined only after evidence.
7. Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s orders dated 27.01.2022 and 04.07.2022, and restored the Trial Court’s order refusing to reject the plaint. It directed the Trial Court to proceed with the suit and decide it on merits.
Importantly, the Court clarified that its observations were limited to the question of maintainability under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and not on the merits of title or possession.
8. Critical Analysis and Commentary
The judgment exemplifies the judicial restraint required while exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11. The decision reaffirms the following core principles:
Primacy of Plaint Averments:
The Court underscored that while assessing whether a suit is barred by law, only the plaint can be examined. This ensures that a plaintiff is not denied the opportunity to prove his claim based on premature factual determinations.Mixed Questions of Law and Fact:
Limitation, particularly in possession suits based on title, depends on when possession became adverse — a fact-specific inquiry. By classifying it as a mixed question, the Court re-emphasized that summary rejection is inappropriate where factual investigation is necessary.Continuing Right to Property:
By citing Thajudeen and Mohammad Yunus, the Court reaffirmed that right to property is a continuing right; so long as ownership subsists, the right to seek declaration or possession endures.Doctrinal Balance Between Efficiency and Fairness:
While Order VII Rule 11 aims to weed out frivolous suits, excessive use of this power risks denying justice to claimants whose rights are yet to be adjudicated. The judgment restores balance by emphasizing substantive justice over procedural technicalities.Relevance to Adverse Possession Jurisprudence:
The decision indirectly narrows the window for defendants seeking dismissal on limitation by asserting adverse possession before trial. It confirms that adverse possession must be pleaded and proved, not presumed.Role of Mutation Proceedings:
The Court correctly distinguished between revenue entries and civil title, preventing administrative records from displacing judicial determination of ownership.Critique of the High Court’s Approach:
The High Court’s reliance on the lapse of time since 1983, ignoring ongoing mutation disputes, reveals a procedural overreach — treating limitation mechanically rather than contextually. The Supreme Court’s correction reaffirms the principle that judicial economy cannot trump procedural fairness.Order II Rule 2 Clarification:
The ruling further clarifies that dismissal of an earlier improperly framed suit does not automatically trigger a bar under Order II Rule 2. The doctrine is aimed at preventing claim splitting, not punishing defective pleadings.
9. Legal Significance and Implications
Reaffirmation of Procedural Discipline:
The case will serve as a benchmark precedent for subordinate and High Courts in exercising discretion under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, particularly emphasizing exclusive reliance on the plaint.Guidance on Limitation in Possession Suits:
It clarifies that Article 65 (12 years) governs suits for possession based on ownership, even when a declaratory component is added.Strengthening Plaintiffs’ Procedural Protection:
Plaintiffs facing adverse possession or will-based defences now have stronger protection from premature rejection, ensuring access to trial.Limiting Summary Rejections:
The judgment discourages the growing trend of using Order VII Rule 11 as a device for mini-trials at the threshold, emphasizing that such applications are to be sparingly entertained.Consistency with Equity and Substantive Justice:
The Court’s approach aligns with the broader jurisprudence of the Supreme Court favouring substantive over procedural justice, ensuring that genuine disputes proceed to trial.
10. Conclusion
In Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh, the Supreme Court restored the true spirit of Order VII Rule 11 CPC by reiterating that only plaint averments matter at the threshold stage. The Court’s nuanced handling of limitation and title claims demonstrates its commitment to preventing procedural devices from eclipsing substantive rights.
By protecting litigants from premature non-suiting, the judgment advances both fairness and doctrinal coherence in civil procedure. It not only corrects an error in the High Court’s reasoning but also provides enduring clarity on the intersection of Order VII Rule 11, Order II Rule 2, and the Limitation Act, 1963 — strengthening the jurisprudential foundation of procedural justice in India.
Edited by:- Param Vijay Singh, LL.B, M.Sc.
Note:- For education purpose only